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|
/*
* Copyright (C) 2014-2021 Firejail Authors
*
* This file is part of firejail project
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
* with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
* 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
*/
#include "firejail.h"
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fnmatch.h>
#include <glob.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifndef O_PATH
#define O_PATH 010000000
#endif
#define TOP_MAX 64 // maximum number of top level directories
// mountinfo functionality test;
// 1. enable TEST_MOUNTINFO definition
// 2. run firejail --whitelist=/any/directory
//#define TEST_MOUNTINFO
static size_t homedir_len = 0; // cache length of homedir string
static size_t runuser_len = 0; // cache length of runuser string
static char *runuser = NULL;
static void whitelist_error(const char *path) {
assert(path);
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid whitelist path %s\n", path);
exit(1);
}
static int whitelist_mkpath(const char* path, mode_t mode) {
// work on a copy of the path
char *dup = strdup(path);
if (!dup)
errExit("strdup");
// only create leading directories, don't create the file
char *p = strrchr(dup, '/');
assert(p);
*p = '\0';
int parentfd = open("/", O_PATH|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (parentfd == -1)
errExit("open");
// traverse the path, return -1 if a symlink is encountered
int fd = -1;
int done = 0;
char *tok = strtok(dup, "/");
assert(tok);
while (tok) {
// create the directory if necessary
if (mkdirat(parentfd, tok, mode) == -1) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
perror("mkdir");
close(parentfd);
free(dup);
return -1;
}
}
else
done = 1;
// open the directory
fd = openat(parentfd, tok, O_PATH|O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
perror("open");
close(parentfd);
free(dup);
return -1;
}
// move on to next path segment
close(parentfd);
parentfd = fd;
tok = strtok(NULL, "/");
}
if (done)
fs_logger2("mkpath", path);
free(dup);
return fd;
}
static void whitelist_file(int dirfd, const char *relpath, const char *path) {
assert(relpath && path);
// open mount source, using a file descriptor that refers to the
// top level directory
// as the top level directory was opened before mounting the tmpfs
// we still have full access to all directory contents
// take care to not follow symbolic links (dirfd was obtained without
// following a link, too)
int fd = safer_openat(dirfd, relpath, O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: skip whitelist %s\n", __LINE__, path);
return;
}
struct stat s;
if (fstat(fd, &s) == -1)
errExit("fstat");
if (S_ISLNK(s.st_mode)) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: skip whitelist %s\n", __LINE__, path);
close(fd);
return;
}
// create mount target as root, except if inside home or run/user/$UID directory
int userprivs = 0;
if ((strncmp(path, cfg.homedir, homedir_len) == 0 && path[homedir_len] == '/') ||
(strncmp(path, runuser, runuser_len) == 0 && path[runuser_len] == '/')) {
EUID_USER();
userprivs = 1;
}
// create path of the mount target
int fd2 = whitelist_mkpath(path, 0755);
if (fd2 == -1) {
// something went wrong during path creation or a symlink was found;
// if there is a symlink somewhere in the path of the mount target,
// assume the file is whitelisted already
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: skip whitelist %s\n", __LINE__, path);
close(fd);
if (userprivs)
EUID_ROOT();
return;
}
// get file name of the mount target
const char *file = gnu_basename(path);
// create mount target itself and open it, a symlink is rejected
int fd3 = -1;
if (S_ISDIR(s.st_mode)) {
// directory foo can exist already:
// firejail --whitelist=~/foo/bar --whitelist=~/foo
if (mkdirat(fd2, file, 0755) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists) {
perror("mkdir");
printf("Debug %d: skip whitelist %s\n", __LINE__, path);
}
close(fd);
close(fd2);
if (userprivs)
EUID_ROOT();
return;
}
fd3 = openat(fd2, file, O_PATH|O_DIRECTORY|O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC);
}
else
// create an empty file, fails with EEXIST if it is whitelisted already:
// firejail --whitelist=/foo --whitelist=/foo/bar
fd3 = openat(fd2, file, O_RDONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
if (fd3 == -1) {
if (errno != EEXIST && (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)) {
perror("open");
printf("Debug %d: skip whitelist %s\n", __LINE__, path);
}
close(fd);
close(fd2);
if (userprivs)
EUID_ROOT();
return;
}
close(fd2);
if (userprivs)
EUID_ROOT();
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Whitelisting %s\n", path);
if (bind_mount_by_fd(fd, fd3))
errExit("mount bind");
// check the last mount operation
MountData *mptr = get_last_mount(); // will do exit(1) if the mount cannot be found
#ifdef TEST_MOUNTINFO
printf("TEST_MOUNTINFO\n");
mptr->dir = "foo";
#endif
// confirm the file was mounted on the right target
// strcmp does not work here, because mptr->dir can be a child mount
size_t path_len = strlen(path);
if (strncmp(mptr->dir, path, path_len) != 0 ||
(*(mptr->dir + path_len) != '\0' && *(mptr->dir + path_len) != '/'))
errLogExit("invalid whitelist mount");
// No mounts are allowed on top level directories. A destination such as "/etc" is very bad!
// - there should be more than one '/' char in dest string
if (mptr->dir == strrchr(mptr->dir, '/'))
errLogExit("invalid whitelist mount");
close(fd);
close(fd3);
fs_logger2("whitelist", path);
}
static void whitelist_symlink(const char *link, const char *target) {
assert(link && target);
// create files as root, except if inside home or run/user/$UID directory
int userprivs = 0;
if ((strncmp(link, cfg.homedir, homedir_len) == 0 && link[homedir_len] == '/') ||
(strncmp(link, runuser, runuser_len) == 0 && link[runuser_len] == '/')) {
EUID_USER();
userprivs = 1;
}
int fd = whitelist_mkpath(link, 0755);
if (fd == -1) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: cannot create symbolic link %s\n", __LINE__, link);
if (userprivs)
EUID_ROOT();
return;
}
// get file name of symlink
const char *file = gnu_basename(link);
// create the link
if (symlinkat(target, fd, file) == -1) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists) {
perror("symlink");
printf("Debug %d: cannot create symbolic link %s\n", __LINE__, link);
}
}
else if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Created symbolic link %s -> %s\n", link, target);
close(fd);
if (userprivs)
EUID_ROOT();
}
static void globbing(const char *pattern) {
EUID_ASSERT();
assert(pattern);
// globbing
glob_t globbuf;
int globerr = glob(pattern, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_NOSORT | GLOB_PERIOD, NULL, &globbuf);
if (globerr) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: failed to glob private-bin pattern %s\n", pattern);
exit(1);
}
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < globbuf.gl_pathc; i++) {
assert(globbuf.gl_pathv[i]);
// testing for GLOB_NOCHECK - no pattern matched returns the original pattern
if (strcmp(globbuf.gl_pathv[i], pattern) == 0)
continue;
// foo/* expands to foo/. and foo/..
const char *base = gnu_basename(globbuf.gl_pathv[i]);
if (strcmp(base, ".") == 0 ||
strcmp(base, "..") == 0)
continue;
// build the new profile command
char *newcmd;
if (asprintf(&newcmd, "whitelist %s", globbuf.gl_pathv[i]) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
// add the new profile command at the end of the list
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Adding new profile command: %s\n", newcmd);
profile_add(newcmd);
}
globfree(&globbuf);
}
// mount tmpfs on all top level directories
static void tmpfs_topdirs(const TopDir *topdirs) {
int tmpfs_home = 0;
int tmpfs_runuser = 0;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < TOP_MAX && topdirs[i].path; i++) {
// do nested top level directories last
// this way '--whitelist=nested_top_level_dir'
// yields the full, unmodified directory
// instead of the tmpfs
if (strcmp(topdirs[i].path, cfg.homedir) == 0) {
tmpfs_home = 1;
continue;
}
if (strcmp(topdirs[i].path, runuser) == 0) {
tmpfs_runuser = 1;
continue;
}
// special case /run
// open /run/firejail, so it can be restored right after mounting the tmpfs
int fd = -1;
if (strcmp(topdirs[i].path, "/run") == 0) {
fd = open(RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1)
errExit("open");
}
// mount tmpfs
fs_tmpfs(topdirs[i].path, 0);
selinux_relabel_path(topdirs[i].path, topdirs[i].path);
// init tmpfs
if (strcmp(topdirs[i].path, "/run") == 0) {
// restore /run/firejail directory
if (mkdir(RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR, 0755) == -1)
errExit("mkdir");
if (bind_mount_fd_to_path(fd, RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR))
errExit("mount bind");
close(fd);
fs_logger2("whitelist", RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR);
// restore /run/user/$UID directory
// get path relative to /run
const char *rel = runuser + 5;
whitelist_file(topdirs[i].fd, rel, runuser);
}
else if (strcmp(topdirs[i].path, "/tmp") == 0) {
// fix pam-tmpdir (#2685)
const char *env = env_get("TMP");
if (env) {
char *pamtmpdir;
if (asprintf(&pamtmpdir, "/tmp/user/%u", getuid()) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (strcmp(env, pamtmpdir) == 0) {
// create empty user-owned /tmp/user/$UID directory
mkdir_attr("/tmp/user", 0711, 0, 0);
selinux_relabel_path("/tmp/user", "/tmp/user");
fs_logger("mkdir /tmp/user");
mkdir_attr(pamtmpdir, 0700, getuid(), 0);
selinux_relabel_path(pamtmpdir, pamtmpdir);
fs_logger2("mkdir", pamtmpdir);
}
free(pamtmpdir);
}
}
// restore user home directory if it is masked by the tmpfs
// creates path owned by root
// does nothing if user home directory doesn't exist
size_t topdir_len = strlen(topdirs[i].path);
if (strncmp(topdirs[i].path, cfg.homedir, topdir_len) == 0 && cfg.homedir[topdir_len] == '/') {
// get path relative to top level directory
const char *rel = cfg.homedir + topdir_len + 1;
whitelist_file(topdirs[i].fd, rel, cfg.homedir);
}
}
// user home directory
if (tmpfs_home) {
EUID_USER();
fs_private(); // checks owner if outside /home
EUID_ROOT();
}
// /run/user/$UID directory
if (tmpfs_runuser) {
fs_tmpfs(runuser, 0);
selinux_relabel_path(runuser, runuser);
}
}
static int reject_topdir(const char *dir) {
if (!whitelist_reject_topdirs)
return 0;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; whitelist_reject_topdirs[i]; i++) {
if (strcmp(dir, whitelist_reject_topdirs[i]) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
// keep track of whitelist top level directories by adding them to an array
// open each directory
static TopDir *add_topdir(const char *dir, TopDir *topdirs, const char *path) {
assert(dir && path);
// /proc and /sys are not allowed
if (strcmp(dir, "/") == 0 ||
strcmp(dir, "/proc") == 0 ||
strcmp(dir, "/sys") == 0)
whitelist_error(path);
// whitelisting home directory is disabled if --private option is present
if (arg_private && strcmp(dir, cfg.homedir) == 0) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: skip %s - a private home dir is configured!\n", __LINE__, path);
return NULL;
}
// do nothing if directory doesn't exist
struct stat s;
if (lstat(dir, &s) != 0) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Cannot access whitelist top level directory %s: %s\n", dir, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
// do nothing if directory is a link
if (!S_ISDIR(s.st_mode)) {
if (S_ISLNK(s.st_mode)) {
fwarning("skipping whitelist %s because %s is a symbolic link\n", path, dir);
return NULL;
}
whitelist_error(path);
}
// do nothing if directory is disabled by administrator
if (reject_topdir(dir)) {
fmessage("Whitelist top level directory %s is disabled in Firejail configuration file\n", dir);
return NULL;
}
// add directory to array
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Adding whitelist top level directory %s\n", dir);
static int cnt = 0;
if (cnt >= TOP_MAX) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: too many whitelist top level directories\n");
exit(1);
}
TopDir *rv = topdirs + cnt;
cnt++;
rv->path = strdup(dir);
if (!rv->path)
errExit("strdup");
// open the directory, don't follow symbolic links
rv->fd = safer_openat(-1, dir, O_PATH|O_NOFOLLOW|O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC);
if (rv->fd == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: cannot open %s\n", dir);
exit(1);
}
return rv;
}
static TopDir *have_topdir(const char *dir, TopDir *topdirs) {
assert(dir);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < TOP_MAX; i++) {
TopDir *rv = topdirs + i;
if (!rv->path)
break;
if (strcmp(dir, rv->path) == 0)
return rv;
}
return NULL;
}
static char *extract_topdir(const char *path) {
assert(path);
char *dup = strdup(path);
if (!dup)
errExit("strdup");
// user home directory can be anywhere; disconnect user home
// whitelisting from top level directory whitelisting
// by treating user home as separate whitelist top level directory
if (strncmp(dup, cfg.homedir, homedir_len) == 0 && dup[homedir_len] == '/')
dup[homedir_len] = '\0';
// /run/user/$UID is treated as top level directory
else if (strncmp(dup, runuser, runuser_len) == 0 && dup[runuser_len] == '/')
dup[runuser_len] = '\0';
// whitelisting in /sys is not allowed, but /sys/module is an exception
// and is treated as top level directory here
else if (strncmp(dup, "/sys/module", 11) == 0 && dup[11] == '/')
dup[11] = '\0';
// treat /usr subdirectories as top level directories
else if (strncmp(dup, "/usr/", 5) == 0) {
char *p = strchr(dup+5, '/');
if (!p)
whitelist_error(path);
*p = '\0';
}
// all other top level directories
else {
assert(dup[0] == '/');
char *p = strchr(dup+1, '/');
if (!p)
whitelist_error(path);
*p = '\0';
}
return dup;
}
void fs_whitelist(void) {
ProfileEntry *entry = cfg.profile;
if (!entry)
return;
if (asprintf(&runuser, "/run/user/%u", getuid()) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
runuser_len = strlen(runuser);
homedir_len = strlen(cfg.homedir);
size_t nowhitelist_c = 0;
size_t nowhitelist_m = 32;
char **nowhitelist = calloc(nowhitelist_m, sizeof(*nowhitelist));
if (nowhitelist == NULL)
errExit("calloc");
TopDir *topdirs = calloc(TOP_MAX, sizeof(*topdirs));
if (topdirs == NULL)
errExit("calloc");
// verify whitelist files, extract symbolic links, etc.
EUID_USER();
while (entry) {
int nowhitelist_flag = 0;
// handle only whitelist and nowhitelist commands
if (strncmp(entry->data, "whitelist ", 10) == 0)
nowhitelist_flag = 0;
else if (strncmp(entry->data, "nowhitelist ", 12) == 0)
nowhitelist_flag = 1;
else {
entry = entry->next;
continue;
}
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: %s\n", __LINE__, entry->data);
const char *dataptr = (nowhitelist_flag)? entry->data + 12: entry->data + 10;
// replace ~ into /home/username or resolve macro
char *expanded = expand_macros(dataptr);
// check if respolving the macro was successful
if (is_macro(expanded) && macro_id(expanded) > -1) {
if (!nowhitelist_flag && (have_topdir(cfg.homedir, topdirs) || add_topdir(cfg.homedir, topdirs, expanded)) && !arg_quiet) {
fprintf(stderr, "***\n");
fprintf(stderr, "*** Warning: cannot whitelist %s directory\n", expanded);
fprintf(stderr, "*** Any file saved in this directory will be lost when the sandbox is closed.\n");
fprintf(stderr, "***\n");
}
entry = entry->next;
free(expanded);
continue;
}
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: expanded: %s\n", __LINE__, expanded);
// path should be absolute at this point
if (expanded[0] != '/')
whitelist_error(expanded);
// sane pathname
char *new_name = clean_pathname(expanded);
free(expanded);
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: new_name: %s\n", __LINE__, new_name);
if (strstr(new_name, ".."))
whitelist_error(new_name);
// /run/firejail is not allowed
if (strncmp(new_name, RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR, strlen(RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR)) == 0)
whitelist_error(new_name);
TopDir *current_top = NULL;
if (!nowhitelist_flag) {
// extract whitelist top level directory
char *dir = extract_topdir(new_name);
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: dir: %s\n", __LINE__, dir);
// check if this top level directory has been processed already
current_top = have_topdir(dir, topdirs);
if (!current_top) { // got new top level directory
current_top = add_topdir(dir, topdirs, new_name);
if (!current_top) { // skip this command, top level directory not valid
entry = entry->next;
free(new_name);
free(dir);
continue;
}
}
free(dir);
}
// extract resolved path of the file
// realpath function will fail with ENOENT if the file is not found or with EACCES if user has no permission
// special processing for /dev/fd, /dev/stdin, /dev/stdout and /dev/stderr
char *fname = NULL;
if (strcmp(new_name, "/dev/fd") == 0)
fname = strdup("/proc/self/fd");
else if (strcmp(new_name, "/dev/stdin") == 0)
fname = strdup("/proc/self/fd/0");
else if (strcmp(new_name, "/dev/stdout") == 0)
fname = strdup("/proc/self/fd/1");
else if (strcmp(new_name, "/dev/stderr") == 0)
fname = strdup("/proc/self/fd/2");
else
fname = realpath(new_name, NULL);
if (!fname) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists) {
printf("Removed path: %s\n", entry->data);
printf("\texpanded: %s\n", new_name);
printf("\trealpath: (null)\n");
printf("\t%s\n", strerror(errno));
}
if (!nowhitelist_flag) {
// if this is not a real path, let's try globbing
// push the new paths at the end of profile entry list
// the new profile entries will be processed in this loop
// currently there is no globbing support for nowhitelist
globbing(new_name);
}
entry = entry->next;
free(new_name);
continue;
}
// /run/firejail is not allowed
if (strncmp(fname, RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR, strlen(RUN_FIREJAIL_DIR)) == 0)
whitelist_error(fname);
if (nowhitelist_flag) {
// store the path in nowhitelist array
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Storing nowhitelist %s\n", fname);
if (nowhitelist_c >= nowhitelist_m) {
nowhitelist_m *= 2;
nowhitelist = realloc(nowhitelist, sizeof(*nowhitelist) * nowhitelist_m);
if (nowhitelist == NULL)
errExit("failed increasing memory for nowhitelist entries");
}
nowhitelist[nowhitelist_c++] = fname;
entry = entry->next;
free(new_name);
continue;
}
else {
// check if the path is in nowhitelist array
size_t i;
int found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nowhitelist_c; i++) {
if (nowhitelist[i] == NULL)
break;
if (strcmp(nowhitelist[i], fname) == 0) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (found) {
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Skip nowhitelisted path %s\n", fname);
entry = entry->next;
free(new_name);
free(fname);
continue;
}
}
// attach whitelist parameters to profile entry
entry->wparam = calloc(1, sizeof(struct wparam_t));
if (!entry->wparam)
errExit("calloc");
assert(current_top);
entry->wparam->top = current_top;
entry->wparam->file = fname;
// mark link
if (is_link(new_name))
entry->wparam->link = new_name;
else
free(new_name);
entry = entry->next;
}
// release nowhitelist memory
free(nowhitelist);
// mount tmpfs on all top level directories
EUID_ROOT();
tmpfs_topdirs(topdirs);
// go through profile rules again, and interpret whitelist commands
entry = cfg.profile;
while (entry) {
if (entry->wparam) {
char *file = entry->wparam->file;
char *link = entry->wparam->link;
const char *topdir = entry->wparam->top->path;
size_t topdir_len = strlen(topdir);
int dirfd = entry->wparam->top->fd;
// top level directories of link and file can differ
// whitelist the file only if it is in same top level directory
if (strncmp(file, topdir, topdir_len) == 0 && file[topdir_len] == '/') {
// get path relative to top level directory
const char *rel = file + topdir_len + 1;
if (arg_debug || arg_debug_whitelists)
printf("Debug %d: file: %s; dirfd: %d; topdir: %s; rel: %s\n", __LINE__, file, dirfd, topdir, rel);
whitelist_file(dirfd, rel, file);
}
// create the link if any
if (link) {
whitelist_symlink(link, file);
free(link);
}
free(file);
free(entry->wparam);
entry->wparam = NULL;
}
entry = entry->next;
}
// release resources
free(runuser);
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < TOP_MAX && topdirs[i].path; i++) {
free(topdirs[i].path);
close(topdirs[i].fd);
}
free(topdirs);
}
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