| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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More liberal use of an already existing fall back path in pulseaudio.c
removes issues caused by symlinks in ~/.config/pulse (issue #3351 and
some others)
Don't die, but print warnings during /home directory masking,
so that users with a symbolic link in their home directory path can
at least make it to a shell prompt (only in combination with pulseaudio fix).
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* Profile for Jitsi Meet desktop app (electron)
* Update description.
* Correctly include global definitions.
* Add jitsi-meet-desktop to firecfg.
* blacklist Jitsi-meet config directory in disable-programs.inc
* Disable more things.
disable-exec.inc not included, as the application shows some error if I
include it.
* Disable more stuff.
* No need to whitelist Downloads directory.
I don't think this application has any file sharing / downloading
feature.
* Use private-bin
I needed to allow the bash executable as well for this to work.
* Add some whitelist rules.
* Use private-cache option
* include disable-exec.inc
Apparently one needs to allow execution in /tmp for the program to work.
* Redirect to electron.profile.
* Use private-etc.
* Do not whitelist Downloads directory.
electron.profile does this, but I do not think this program needs it.
* Rearrange whitelisted files to alphabetical order.
* Move nonwhitelist to appropriate section.
* Newlines as section separators.
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Add new profile: nicotine
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…g.config (#3333).
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firejail can blacklist (and now also whitelist) files based on glob
pattern. This pattern is evaluated at firejail start, and not updated
at run time. This patch documents this behavior.
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Delete two unused variables.
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See discussion in https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3326.
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This patch also allows setting the DBus policies to filter even if
xdg-dbus-proxy is not installed. In that case, unrestricted access to the bus is
allowed, but a warning is emitted.
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To avoid race conditions, the proxy sockets from /run/firejail/dbus/ are
bind-mounted to /run/firejail/mnt/dbus/, which is controlled by root.
Instead of relying on the default locations of the DBus sockets, the environment
variables DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS and DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS are set
accordingly.
User sockets are tried in the following order when starting the proxy:
* DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRES
* /run/user/<pid>/bus
* /run/user/<pid>/dbus/user_bus_socket
These are all blocked (including DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS if it points at a
socket in the filesystem) when the filtering or blocking policy is active.
System sockets are tried in the following order:
* DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS
* /run/dbus/system_bus_socket
These are all blocked (including DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS if it points at a
socket in the filesystem) when the filtering or blocking policy is active.
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The options --dbus-user.talk, --dbus-user.own, --dbus-system.talk, and
--dbus-system.own control which names can be accessed and owned on the user and
system buses.
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* The proxy is forked off outside the sandbox namespace to protect the
fds of the original buses from the sandboxed process.
* The /run/firejail/dbus directory (with the sticky bit set) holds the proxy
sockets. The sockets are <parent pid>-user and <parent pid>-system for the
user and system buses, respectively. Each socket is owned by the sandbox user.
* The sockets are bind-mounted over their expected locations and the
/run/firejail/dbus directory is subsequently hidden from the sandbox.
* Upon sandbox exit, the xdg-dbus-proxy instance is terminated and the sockets
are cleaned up.
* Filter rules will be added in a future commit.
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To contain processes forked for long time, such as the xdg-dbus-proxy,
sbox_exec_v can be used, which is the non-forking version of sbox_run_v.
Additionally, the SBOX_KEEPS_FDS flag avoid closing any open fds,
so fds needed by the subordinate process can be left open before calling
sbox_exec_v.
This flag does not makes sense for sbox_run_v, and causes an assertion failure.
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Allow setting a separate policy for the user and system buses.
For now, the filter policy is equivalent to the none (block) policy.
Future commits will add more configuration options and filters.
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Let user specify the action when seccomp filters trigger:
- errno name like EPERM (default) or ENOSYS: return errno and let the process continue.
- 'kill': kill the process as previous versions
The default action is EPERM, but killing can still be specified with
syscall:kill syntax or globally with seccomp-error-action=kill. The
action can be also overridden /etc/firejail/firejail.config file.
Not killing the process weakens Firejail slightly when trying to
contain intrusion, but it may also allow tighter filters if the
only alternative is to allow a system call.
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If `less` is sandboxed, then we get a similar message to below
when calling `man <anything>`
Error clone: main.c:2743 main: Operation not permitted
man: command exited with status 1: sed -e '/^[[:space:]]*$/{ N; /^[[:space:]]*\n[[:space:]]*$/D; }' | LESS=-ix8RmPm Manual page grep(1) ?ltline %lt?L/%L.:byte %bB?s/%s..?e (END):?pB %pB\%.. (press h for help or q to quit)$PM Manual page grep(1) ?ltline %lt?L/%L.:byte %bB?s/%s..?e (END):?pB %pB\%.. (press h for help or q to quit)$-R MAN_PN=grep(1) less
See also
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=899143
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/1856
Noticed on Debian 10, firejail 0.9.63
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Simple sanity checks for arguments and environment
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Restrict number of program arguments and their length as well as
number of environment variables and their length.
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- fix description
- add gnome-klotski, five-or-more, swell-foop
[skip ci]
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- blobwars
- gravity-beams-and-evaporating-stars
- hyperrogue
- jumpnbump-menu (alias)
- jumpnbump
- magicor
- mindless
- mirrormagic
- mrrescue
- scorched3d-wrapper (alias)
- scorchwentbonkers
- seahorse-adventures
- wordwarvi
- xbill
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Preserve CFLAGS given to configure in common.mk.in
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- four-in-a-row
- gnome-mahjongg
- gnome-robots
- gnome-sudoku
- gnome-taquin
- gnome-tetravex
harden gnome-chess
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Create ferdi.profile
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smitsohu
Kishore96in
rusty-snake
Christian Pinedo
netblue30
Antonio Russo
Topi Miettinen
glitsj16
Kristóf Marussy
Fred Barclay
Lior Stern
0x7969