| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
now covers syscalls up to including process_madvise (440)
group assignment was blindly copied from systemd:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/729d2df8065ac90ac606e1fff91dc2d588b2795d/src/shared/seccomp-util.c#L305
the only exception is close_range, which was added to both @basic-io and @file-system
this commit adds the following syscalls to the default blacklist:
pidfd_getfd,fsconfig,fsmount,fsopen,fspick,move_mount,open_tree
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
- Fix #4157 -- [Feature] Should rmenv GitHub auth tokens
There are still more token variables from other program that should be
added.
- Fix #4093 -- darktable needs read access to liblua*
- Fix #4383 -- move noblacklist ${HOME}/.bogofilter to email-common.profile for claws-mail (and other mailers)
- Fix xournalpp.profile
- syscalls.txt: ausyscall i386 -> firejail --debug-syscalls32
|
|
|
|
| |
Rework + suggest --seccomp-error-action=log
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
* remove mincore
* add @default without chroot
* add @default-nodebuggers without chroot
|
| |
|
|
Create etc/templates
* profile.template
* redirect_alias-profile.template
* syscalls.txt
* Notes
|