| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Since /etc/profile is present, add the other shell-related paths in /etc
that are listed on ids.config.
Suggestion by @rusty-snake[1].
Relates to #5167 #5170.
[1] https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/5167#pullrequestreview-989621852
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Since /etc/profile.d is already being blacklisted.
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To disable-shell.inc.
Interactive shells can be executed from certain development-related
programs (such as IDEs) and the shells themselves are not blocked by
default, but this shell startup directory currently is. To avoid
running a shell without access to potentially needed startup files, only
blacklist /etc/profile.d when interactive shells are also blocked.
Note that /etc/profile.d should only be of concern to interactive
shells, so a profile that includes both disable-shell.inc and
allow-bin-sh.inc (which likely means that it needs access to only
non-interactive shells) should not be affected by the blacklisting.
Relates to #3411 #5159.
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nvim: add XDG_STATE_HOME path
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Default paths as of neovim 0.7.0:
* backupdir: $XDG_DATA_HOME/nvim/backup//
* directory: $XDG_DATA_HOME/nvim/swap//
* undodir: $XDG_DATA_HOME/nvim/undo//
* viewdir: $XDG_DATA_HOME/nvim/view//
* shada file: $XDG_DATA_HOME/nvim/shada/main.shada
* log dir: $XDG_CACHE_HOME/nvim/log
Default paths as of [1]:
* backupdir: $XDG_STATE_HOME/nvim/backup//
* directory: $XDG_STATE_HOME/nvim/swap//
* undodir: $XDG_STATE_HOME/nvim/undo//
* viewdir: $XDG_STATE_HOME/nvim/view//
* shada file: $XDG_STATE_HOME/nvim/shada/main.shada
* log dir: $XDG_STATE_HOME/nvim/log
[1] https://github.com/neovim/neovim/pull/15583
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It's already blacklisted on disable-common.inc.
Added on commit ec966d4c0 ("fix: neovim profile", 2022-01-10) /
PR #4841.
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* update for wget2
* allow ${HOME}/.local/share/wget
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https://store.steampowered.com/app/219150/Hotline_Miami/
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disable-common.inc: make ~/.config/pkcs11 read-only
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It looks like it allows arbitrary command execution. From
pkcs11.conf(5):
> remote:
> Instead of loading the PKCS#11 module locally, run the module
> remotely.
>
> Specify a command to run, prefixed with | a pipe. The command
> must speak the p11-kit remoting protocol on its standard in
> and standard out. For example:
>
> remote: |ssh user@remote p11-kit remote /path/to/module.so
>
> Other forms of remoting will appear in later p11-kit releases.
Environment: p11-kit 0.24.1-1 on Artix Linux.
Currently this entry only exists on whitelist-common.inc, added on
commit f74cfd07c ("add p11-kit support - #1646").
With this commit applied, all read-only entries on whitelist-commons.inc
are also part of disable-common.inc.
See also the discussion on #5069.
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It is used for storing AppImages.
Note that even when blacklisting a directory, it is possible to execute
an AppImage from it. For example, the following works:
firejail --noprofile --blacklist='${HOME}/Applications' --appimage \
~/Applications/foo.AppImage
While the resulting process does not appear to have access to the
blacklisted directory.
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This directory is monitored by both appimaged[1] and
AppImageLauncher[2]. Also, when opening an AppImage with
AppImageLauncher, it may prompt the user to move the AppImage to
~/Applications.
[1] https://github.com/AppImage/appimaged/blob/2323f1825ed6abe19f2d3791d81307449692be03/README.md#monitored-directories
[2] https://github.com/TheAssassin/AppImageLauncher/wiki/Configuration
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* ocenaudio: blacklist cache dir
* ocenaudio: hardenings
* ocenaudio: fix protocol comment
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This amends commit f32cb8393 ("Blacklist scala devel stuff", 2022-03-05)
/ PR #5013.
See the following review:
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/5013#pullrequestreview-903794958
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* opera fixes
* disable-common.inc: add blacklist /usr/lib/opera/opera_sandbox
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https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/discussions/4993 (#5042)
* refactor mupdf
* refactor mupdf
* refactor mupdf
* refactor mupdf
* add mupdf-gl blacklist
* move history file back to mupdf-gl
* refactor mupdf-gl
* add no3d to mupdf.profile
* add suggestions from review
* drop unix from protocol [accumulates]
* fix protocol
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This amends commit af8f681c0 ("steam.profile: allow "${HOME}/.prey"",
2022-03-11) / PR #5029.
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as suggested by @rusty-snake
in addition blacklist/noblacklist/whitelist songrec application files
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* add opera-developer to firecfg
* add opera-developer
* fix typo
* add configs for opera-developer
* Create opera-developer.profile
* fixes for opera-developer
* fix for opera-developer
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* Add support for changing appearance of the Qt6 apps with qt6ct
* Remove qt5ct artifact from zeal.profile
* Remove qt5ct artifact from bibletime.profile
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Allow common access to EGL External platform configuration directory
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This commit fixes Issue #4893 by allowing access to the configuration directory for the Wayland EGL external platform library
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steam.profile: allow ~/.config/MangoHud
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Add neovim profile
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Seafile
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{lutris,wine}.profile: allow ~/.cache/wine
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Blacklist rclone, 1Password, Ledger Live and cointop
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add a profile for cointop
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