| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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* Create node.profile
* Create node-gyp.profile
* refactor npm as redirect
* Create npx.profile
* Create nvm.profile
* Create semver.profile
* refactor yarn as redirect
* collect node.js stack configuration in common profile
* add ~/.nvm to node section
* account for node-gyp python dependency
* read-only ~/.nvm for node.js stack
* blacklist ~/.nvm for node.js stack
* move env var comment cfr. profile.template
* Delete node-gyp.profile
node-gyp is a shell script with a node shebang. We've got that covered via node.profile.
* Delete npx.profile
npx is a shell script with a node shebang. We've got that covered via node.profile.
* Delete semver.profile
semver is a shell script that calls node. We've got that covered via node.profile.
* add node and nvm to new profiles section
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* Add Sway profile
* Fix issue
Not working then including firefox-common-addons.profile
* Allow sway's fallback config
* So I agree with @glitsj16 and @BL4CKH47H4CK3R
so..
`No its not needed as it reveals lots of important /usr/share folders like /usr/share/fonts which can used for font fingerprinting and OS detection. Like the site or attacker will know that which font you are using. Linux and windows common font are not same so its a problem. Besides there are so many other important folders as I see. Librewolf can launch and work perfectly without this options`
* well..
Revert `include whitelist-usr-share-common.inc`
Sync with Firefox profile
* 😄 What just hapened
* 🔄 Sync with upstream
* Merge tested from PR
* 🔄 Sync with upstream
* Merge tested from PR
* Revert changes
* Add Sway profile
* Fix issue
Not working then including firefox-common-addons.profile
* Allow sway's fallback config
* So I agree with @glitsj16 and @BL4CKH47H4CK3R
so..
`No its not needed as it reveals lots of important /usr/share folders like /usr/share/fonts which can used for font fingerprinting and OS detection. Like the site or attacker will know that which font you are using. Linux and windows common font are not same so its a problem. Besides there are so many other important folders as I see. Librewolf can launch and work perfectly without this options`
* 🔄 Rebase
* 😄 What just hapened
* Merge tested from PR
* 🔄 Sync with upstream
* Merge tested from PR
* Revert changes
* Update
* Update librewolf.profile
Co-authored-by: rusty-snake <41237666+rusty-snake@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: rusty-snake <41237666+rusty-snake@users.noreply.github.com>
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The paths are taken from ssh(1) and sshd(8).
$ pacman -Q openssh
openssh 8.4p1-2
These are only used by sshd(8), so always blacklist them:
* ~/.rhosts: controls remote access to the local machine
* ~/.shosts: same as above
* ~/.ssh/authorized_keys: same as above
* ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2: same as above
* ~/.ssh/environment: potentially allows arbitrary command execution on
the local machine
* ~/.ssh/rc: allows arbitrary command execution on the local machine
* /etc/hosts.equiv: system-wide equivalent of ~/.rhosts
Note: There are files in /etc/ssh that are equivalent to some of the
above ones, but they are already blocked by `blacklist /etc/ssh/*`.
Note2: From sshd(8):
> If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the
> environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
So even if the user shell is set to /usr/bin/firejail and
disable-common.inc is loaded, this patch shouldn't interfere with sshd.
This file is actually used by ssh(1), so just mark it read-only:
* ~/.ssh/config: allows arbitrary command execution on the remote
machine (with e.g.: RemoteCommand) and also defines the connection
strength
Since version 7.3p1 (released on 2016-08-01), openssh supports including
other config files on ssh_config(5)[1][2]. This is the conventional
path for storing them[3], so mark it read-only:
* ~/.ssh/config.d: same as above
P.S. See also the explanation on the commit b5542fc94
("disable-common.inc: read-only access to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"),
which last touched/added the "Remote access" section.
[1]: https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git/commit/?id=dc7990be865450574c7940c9880567f5d2555b37
[2]: https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-7.3
[3]: https://superuser.com/a/1142813
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This is the system-wide equivalent of ~/.ssh/config.
$ pacman -Q openssh
openssh 8.4p1-2
Reasons for blacklisting both /etc/ssh and /etc/ssh/* on
disable-common.inc:
Leave /etc/ssh that way so that profiles without allow-ssh.inc remain
unable to see inside of /etc/ssh. And blacklist /etc/ssh/* so that
profiles with allow-ssh.inc are able to access only nonblacklisted files
inside of /etc/ssh.
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That was added on the commit e93fbf3bd ("disable ssh-agent sockets in
disable-programs.inc").
Currently, it's the only ssh-related entry on disable-programs.inc.
Further, it seems that all the other socket blacklists live on
disable-common.inc. Also, even though this socket does not necessarily
allow arbitrary command execution on the local machine (like some paths
on disable-common.inc do), it could still do so for remote systems.
Put it above the "top secret" section, like the terminal sockets are
above the terminal server section.
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* add yarn & reorder
* add node-gyp & yarn files
* Create nodejs-common.profile
* Create yarn.profile
* refactor npm.profile
* add new profile: yarn
* read-only's for npm/yarn
Thanks to the [suggestion](https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3876#pullrequestreview-564682989) from @kmk3.
* ignore read-only's for npm
As [suggested](https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3876#pullrequestreview-564682989) by @kmk3.
* ignore read-only for yarn
As suggested in https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3876#pullrequestreview-564682989 by @kmk3.
* remove quiet from nodejs-common.profile
quiet should go into the caller profiles instead
* add quiet to npm.profile
Thanks @rusty-snake for the review.
* re-ordering some options
* re-ordering
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Add the missing binaries in the DNS section, as suggested by @glitsj16:
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3810#issuecomment-742920539
Packages and their relevant binaries:
* bind: dnssec-*
* knot: khost
* unbound: unbound-host
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drill(1) from ldns is the first tool suggested on the Arch Wiki for DNS
lookup:
https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Domain_name_resolution#Lookup_utilities
Home page: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/about/
$ pacman -Q ldns
ldns 1.7.1-2
$ pacman -Qlq ldns | grep bin
/usr/bin/
/usr/bin/drill
/usr/bin/ldns-chaos
/usr/bin/ldns-compare-zones
/usr/bin/ldns-config
/usr/bin/ldns-dane
/usr/bin/ldns-dpa
/usr/bin/ldns-gen-zone
/usr/bin/ldns-key2ds
/usr/bin/ldns-keyfetcher
/usr/bin/ldns-keygen
/usr/bin/ldns-mx
/usr/bin/ldns-notify
/usr/bin/ldns-nsec3-hash
/usr/bin/ldns-read-zone
/usr/bin/ldns-resolver
/usr/bin/ldns-revoke
/usr/bin/ldns-rrsig
/usr/bin/ldns-signzone
/usr/bin/ldns-test-edns
/usr/bin/ldns-testns
/usr/bin/ldns-update
/usr/bin/ldns-verify-zone
/usr/bin/ldns-version
/usr/bin/ldns-walk
/usr/bin/ldns-zcat
/usr/bin/ldns-zsplit
/usr/bin/ldnsd
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- disable-common: read-only ${HOME}/.zfunc
- fix #3761 -- w3m with w3m-img installed does not display images when on virtual console/framebuffer
- yelp can be used to display manpages
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Follow-up from discussion in https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3751.
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- this might need to be looked into
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- update README.md and RELNOTES
- add 'blacklist ${RUNUSER}/.flatpak-cache' to disable-common.inc
- fix #3728, fonts in openSUSE KDE with wc / wusc
- fix gnome-todo
- fix xournalpp MathTeX whitelist
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* Update disable-common.inc
* Update disable-common.inc
[skip ci]
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It's a collection of many tools, that might not be allowed individually.
When it's needed, it can easily be allowed again.
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