| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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Request behavior change description in bug reports
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program
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See discussion in https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3326.
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Add bug report template
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(Mostly) auto-generated with GitHub, will need tweaking over time
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caps are already handled by caps.keep ... in this profile
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See
- 07fac581f6b9b5ed068f4c54a9521b51826375c5 for new dbus filters
- https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3326#issuecomment-610423183
Except for ocenaudio, access/restrictions on dbus options should
be unchanged
Ocenaudio profile: dbus filters were sandboxed (initially `nodbus`
was enabled) since comments indicated blocking dbus meant
preferences were broken
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Fine-grained DBus sandboxing
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This patch also allows setting the DBus policies to filter even if
xdg-dbus-proxy is not installed. In that case, unrestricted access to the bus is
allowed, but a warning is emitted.
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To avoid race conditions, the proxy sockets from /run/firejail/dbus/ are
bind-mounted to /run/firejail/mnt/dbus/, which is controlled by root.
Instead of relying on the default locations of the DBus sockets, the environment
variables DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS and DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS are set
accordingly.
User sockets are tried in the following order when starting the proxy:
* DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRES
* /run/user/<pid>/bus
* /run/user/<pid>/dbus/user_bus_socket
These are all blocked (including DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS if it points at a
socket in the filesystem) when the filtering or blocking policy is active.
System sockets are tried in the following order:
* DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS
* /run/dbus/system_bus_socket
These are all blocked (including DBUS_SYSTEM_BUS_ADDRESS if it points at a
socket in the filesystem) when the filtering or blocking policy is active.
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The options --dbus-user.talk, --dbus-user.own, --dbus-system.talk, and
--dbus-system.own control which names can be accessed and owned on the user and
system buses.
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* The proxy is forked off outside the sandbox namespace to protect the
fds of the original buses from the sandboxed process.
* The /run/firejail/dbus directory (with the sticky bit set) holds the proxy
sockets. The sockets are <parent pid>-user and <parent pid>-system for the
user and system buses, respectively. Each socket is owned by the sandbox user.
* The sockets are bind-mounted over their expected locations and the
/run/firejail/dbus directory is subsequently hidden from the sandbox.
* Upon sandbox exit, the xdg-dbus-proxy instance is terminated and the sockets
are cleaned up.
* Filter rules will be added in a future commit.
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To contain processes forked for long time, such as the xdg-dbus-proxy,
sbox_exec_v can be used, which is the non-forking version of sbox_run_v.
Additionally, the SBOX_KEEPS_FDS flag avoid closing any open fds,
so fds needed by the subordinate process can be left open before calling
sbox_exec_v.
This flag does not makes sense for sbox_run_v, and causes an assertion failure.
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Allow setting a separate policy for the user and system buses.
For now, the filter policy is equivalent to the none (block) policy.
Future commits will add more configuration options and filters.
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Let user specify the action when seccomp filters trigger:
- errno name like EPERM (default) or ENOSYS: return errno and let the process continue.
- 'kill': kill the process as previous versions
The default action is EPERM, but killing can still be specified with
syscall:kill syntax or globally with seccomp-error-action=kill. The
action can be also overridden /etc/firejail/firejail.config file.
Not killing the process weakens Firejail slightly when trying to
contain intrusion, but it may also allow tighter filters if the
only alternative is to allow a system call.
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fix #3321
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If `less` is sandboxed, then we get a similar message to below
when calling `man <anything>`
Error clone: main.c:2743 main: Operation not permitted
man: command exited with status 1: sed -e '/^[[:space:]]*$/{ N; /^[[:space:]]*\n[[:space:]]*$/D; }' | LESS=-ix8RmPm Manual page grep(1) ?ltline %lt?L/%L.:byte %bB?s/%s..?e (END):?pB %pB\%.. (press h for help or q to quit)$PM Manual page grep(1) ?ltline %lt?L/%L.:byte %bB?s/%s..?e (END):?pB %pB\%.. (press h for help or q to quit)$-R MAN_PN=grep(1) less
See also
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=899143
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/1856
Noticed on Debian 10, firejail 0.9.63
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Simple sanity checks for arguments and environment
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Restrict number of program arguments and their length as well as
number of environment variables and their length.
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Speedup the buildsystem
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- replaing 'include /etc/firejail/foobar.inc' with
'include $(sysconfdir)/firejail/foobar.inc' is useless since 0.9.58
- onetime calling install with globbing is faster the a loop calling
install nearly 1000 times
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nc is a symlink to ncat on some distros
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see https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3292#issuecomment-603467884
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Syslog is spammed with the following message otherwise:
Could not create AF_NETLINK socket
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- fix description
- add gnome-klotski, five-or-more, swell-foop
[skip ci]
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- blobwars
- gravity-beams-and-evaporating-stars
- hyperrogue
- jumpnbump-menu (alias)
- jumpnbump
- magicor
- mindless
- mirrormagic
- mrrescue
- scorched3d-wrapper (alias)
- scorchwentbonkers
- seahorse-adventures
- wordwarvi
- xbill
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I'd like to tighten this up more esp. for seccomp
- caps.keep sys_chroot needed or fails with
Cannot chroot into /proc/ directory: Operation not permitted
1. caps.drop all replaced with caps.keep
- caps.keep sys_admin needed or fails with
Failed to move to new namespace: PID namespaces supported, Network namespace supported, but failed: errno = Operation not permitted
2. nonewprivs dropped to avoid failure:
The setuid sandbox is not running as root. Common causes:
* An unprivileged process using ptrace on it, like a debugger.
* A parent process set prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...)
Failed to move to new namespace: PID namespaces supported, Network namespace supported, but failed: errno = Operation not permitted
3. noroot dropped to avoid failure:
[22:0404/121643.400578:FATAL:setuid_sandbox_host.cc(157)] The SUID sandbox helper binary was found, but is not configured correctly. Rather than run without sandboxing I'm aborting now. You need to make sure that /usr/lib/slack/chrome-sandbox is owned by root and has mode 4755.
4. Removed protocol filter
to avoid:
The setuid sandbox is not running as root. Common causes:
* An unprivileged process using ptrace on it, like a debugger.
* A parent process set prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, ...)
Failed to move to new namespace: PID namespaces supported, Network namespace supported, but failed: errno = Operation not permitted
5. Unable to get a working seccomp filter
See
https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/2946#issuecomment-598612520
seccomp !chroot seems to have worked for earlier versions of slack
6. private-tmp means no tray icon
Observed on Debian 10, Slack 4.4.0
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Access to ${HOME}/.cache/mozilla actually not necessary to let Firefox open links
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