| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age |
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* add ~/.uim.d directory to whitelist-common.inc
uim is a multilingual input method framework (similar to ibus, which has its own entry in this file).
* add /var/lib/uim to whitelist-var-common.inc
When user installs an uim module (for example, an input method like anthy or mozc), it gets registered in a file in this directory.
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hardening: run plugins with dumpable flag cleared
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1) copy xauth binary into the sandbox and set mode to 0711, so it runs
with cleared dumpable flag for unprivileged users
2) run xauth in an sbox sandbox
3) generate Xauthority file in runtime directory instead of /tmp;
this way xauth is able to connect to the X11 socket even if the
abstract socket doesn't exist, for example because a new network
namespace was instantiated
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the kernel clears the dumpable flag if a user has no read permission on an
executable and it is owned by another user; I omitted faudit, fbuilder and
ftee for now as they are not used to configure the sandbox itself, and as
this commit is going to complicate debugging efforts to some extent
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cat option
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/etc/apparmor.d/local/firejail.default - merge form 0.9.62.4
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Allow video for Signal profile
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Signal is adding support for video calls on desktop, see
https://signal.org/blog/desktop-calling-beta/
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* Use whitelisting for video players
See https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3469
* Update media player whitelists
See reviews at https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/pull/3472
Block $DOCUMENTS
Make $DESKTOP read-only
* Review fixes: include read-only Desktop in whitelist
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harden bandwidth command
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add extra checks to defend against command injection (respective strings are controlled by Firejail, so this should be redundant and only for the paranoid), run shell in a minimal sandbox
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'modules' can also be seen as a sub-directory, e.g.
./powerpc64le-linux-gnu/gio/modules/libgiolibproxy.so
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On 32bit architectures like armhf, the output was "unlimited" instead
of the expected value.
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on Ubuntu autopkgtest runs on armhf, /dev/zero creation fails.
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The systemd service file ./systemd/system/sysinit.target.wants/systemd-modules-load.service
can exist which will lead to a match for "modules", though we are
only looking for the modules directory.
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Fix nomacs
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```
Aug 11 16:32:32 korte audit[29004]: SECCOMP auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000
ses=2 subj==firejail-default (enforce) pid=29004 comm="nomacs"
exe="/usr/bin/nomacs" sig=31 arch=c000003e syscall=9 compat=0
ip=0x7fa2a1cc98c6 code=0x0
```
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mkdeb.sh should not use files outside $CODE_DIR
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seccomp: logging
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Allow `log` as an alternative seccomp error action instead of killing
or returning an errno code.
Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
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Initial,amend: wrong dir,delete gtk-*,added new files
Co-authored-by: kortewegdevries <k0rtic_dv@aol.com>
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add check so that environment variable FIREJAIL_CHROOT_X11 can be used
to mount /tmp/.X11-unix into the chroot; issue #3568
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When redirecting output via --output or --output-stderr, firejail was
concatenating all command line arguments into a single string
that was passed to a shell. As the arguments were no longer escaped,
the shell was able to interpret them.
Someone who has control over the command line arguments of the
sandboxed application could use this to run arbitrary other commands.
Instead of passing it through a shell for piping the output to ftee,
the pipeline is now manually created and the processes are executed
directly.
Fixes: CVE-2020-17368
Reported-by: Tim Starling <tstarling@wikimedia.org>
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Firejail was parsing --output and --output-stderr options even after
the end-of-options separator ("--"), which would allow someone who
has control over command line options of the sandboxed application,
to write data to a specified file.
Fixes: CVE-2020-17367
Reported-by: Tim Starling <tstarling@wikimedia.org>
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closes #1139
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* Add profile for otter-browser
Initial
* private-bin,sorting
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Ensure that all standard streams are open and we don't inadvertently print to files opened for a different reason; in general we can expect glibc
to take care of this, but it doesn't cover the case where a sandbox is started by root. The added code also serves as a fallback.
Unrelated: For what it's worth, shift umask call closer to main start, so it runs before lowering privileges and before anything can really go wrong.
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* Added git-cola profile
Initial
* Edit private-etc
Add alternatives,pki
* Add disable-xdg
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